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Cyber-physical Systems of Systems (SoSs) are large-scale systems made of independent and autonomous
cyber-physical Constituent Systems (CSs) which may interoperate to achieve high-level goals also with the
intervention of humans. Providing security in such SoSs means, among other features, forecasting and antic-
ipating evolving SoS functionalities, ultimately identifying possible detrimental phenomena that may result
from the interactions of CSs and humans. Such phenomena, usually called emergent phenomena, are often
complex and difficult to capture: the first appearance of an emergent phenomenon in a cyber-physical SoS is
often a surprise to the observers. Adequate support to understand emergent phenomena will assist in reduc-
ing both the likelihood of design or operational flaws, and the time needed to analyze the relations amongst
the CSs, which always has a key economic significance. This article presents a threat analysis methodology
and a supporting tool aimed at (i) identifying (emerging) threats in evolving SoSs, (ii) reducing the cognitive
load required to understand an SoS and the relations among CSs, and (iii) facilitating SoS risk management
by proposing mitigation strategies for SoS administrators. The proposed methodology, as well as the tool, is
empirically validated on Smart Grid case studies by submitting questionnaires to a user base composed of 3
stakeholders and 18 BSc and MSc students.
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1 INTRODUCTION
In the cyber-physical System-of-Systems (SoS) paradigm [1, 18, 21], an SoS consists of the inte-
gration of independent, autonomous Constituent Systems (CSs), which are networked together
to satisfy a global high-level goal under certain rules of engagement. Concisely, domain experts
usually identify (i) a micro-level, where CSs operate by themselves and (ii) a macro-level, which
describes behaviors that can be achieved only by cooperating CSs.
The role of security is gaining a predominant relevance in modern cyber-physical SoSs [1]. In
this article, we focus on threat analysis, which is typically carried out as part of the risk assessment
process to identify threats, their impact, and mitigations, at an early stage of system implemen-
tation [10]. Acknowledged approaches to security, applied also by standardization bodies [10] or
governmental agencies [49, 50], carry out threat analysis of systems that are usually seen as static,
with no relevant changes to their functional and non-functional requirements during their life. In
this context, security properties rarely change during system life and their achievement is sup-
ported by identifying threats and corresponding mitigation strategies that typically do not need
to be revised.
On the contrary, SoSs pose new constraints to the threat analysis processes [2], especially re-
garding their (i) evolutionary nature and (ii) emergent properties. Evolution refers to long-term
changes required to accomplish variations to the requirements in light of an always-changing en-
vironment [3]. Emergence is a phenomenon that appears at the macro level of an SoS and it is
new with respect to the non-relational phenomena of any of its proper parts at the micro level
(CSs). Emergent phenomena can be of a different nature: either beneficial or detrimental [18, 14].
A typical example of detrimental emergence can be observed in automotive complex systems com-
posed by cars that may decide to take the same highway to reach their destination, thus leading
to traffic jams. If we only look at the single CSs without considering their relational phenomena
we cannot be aware of the potential negative consequences. To this end, it is required to identify
not only the misbehavior of individual or coordinated CSs, but also the detrimental behaviors de-
scribed by emergent phenomena that appear at the macro-level of the SoS after an evolution step
of the SoS. Lastly, threats should be associated with appropriate mitigation strategies in order to
support the dynamic achievement of the security properties. Further, emerging phenomena are
at the same time leveraging on the exploitation of composable [51] properties of SoS, and pro-
moting such properties, especially for the service and architectural levels of abstractions. Freedom
in composition allows for self-organized system reconfiguration such that the system is able to
perform optimally in case new functionalities become available and previously existing one be-
come unavailable. The existence of emergence itself is favored by such loose composition, while
being able to manage emergence may allow predicting the effects of composition on dependability,
safety, security, availability [18]. Additionally to the above observations, emergencemay also break
the expected rules for compositionality [52]; especially, unexpected emergence phenomena may
change the meaning of system parts, or the syntactic rules by which system parts are combined,
which determine system compositionality.
As a result, most of the existing threat analysis processes as [10] do not fit into SoS requirements
because they are not able to capture the variations to the security requirements which have to
be met in order to achieve safe and secure SoS evolutions. In addition, classical approaches do
not primarily focus on risks associated with how autonomous CSs may interact with each other,
leading to emergent phenomena. Such classical approaches generally fail to adequately capture the
complex relations between SoS evolution, emergence phenomena and security requirements. Such
challenges are already partially tackled in [5, 6, 7, 8], where the authors proposed risk assessment
approaches devoted to evolving systems.
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More specifically, in this article, we present a methodology which supports an evolutionary
threat analysis by focusing on emergent phenomena originating in an evolving cyber-physical SoS.
Detecting and analyzing emerging properties of an SoSmay lead to identifying future threats to the
achievement of existing security properties. Our methodology allows us to (i) identify threats aris-
ing from the planned SoS evolution and (ii) propose adequate mitigation strategies to SoS admin-
istrators. Such methodology is supported by a tool that encodes: (i) a mapping between both cyber
and physical threats and the system evolutions and (ii) the behavior or the amount of CSs constitut-
ing the targeted SoS. By automatically detecting emergent behaviors and consequently identifying
novel threats, the tool aims at reducing the cognitive load–or rather the total amount of mental ef-
fort being used in the working memory [28]–required from the Risk Assessment (RA) analyst.
The methodology and the supporting tool are evaluated by considering power grids as a spe-
cific category of SoS: (Smart) power grids are an ensemble of electric components, communication
nodes, critical infrastructures, and human-made policies that are networked together to achieve
high-level goals such as the continuous provision of energy to all the grid components. Analyzing
effects of the interconnection among these components is often complex. RA experts need signifi-
cant amounts of time and efforts (including cognitive load) to complete such tasks. We first submit-
ted an evolving Smart Grid SoS scenario to a group composed of 18 BSc and MSc students and we
tasked them to perform several security-related analyses either with or without our methodology
and the supporting tool. Then, we conducted a separate gaming session with three stakeholders,
namely a City Planner, a Distributed Network Operator, and a Citizen&Business Representative. In
both sessions, we asked participants to fill out questionnaires aimed at evaluating the difficulties
they encountered in completing the tasks above. In addition, the questionnaires aimed at measur-
ing usability factors, such as efficiency and difficulty, which are indicators of the cognitive load
[29, 30]. Results show that applying our tool for identifying threats was perceived well, while stu-
dents critically reflected on its strengths and weaknesses and stakeholders discussed the market
opportunities and future improvements of the tool.
This article starts with basics on SoSs and SoS security in Section 2. Section 3 instead presents
related work to threat analysis in complex systems and SoSs, and positions our article with respect
to the surveyed works. In Section 4, a motivating Smart Grid scenario, inspired to the campus of
the University of Twente in the Netherlands, is presented, and it will be used as running example to
explain the methodology. The methodology is discussed in Section 5 and Section 6. The supporting
tool is presented in Section 7, while the results of the users’ base assessment are described in
Section 8. Finally, in Section 9, we conclude the article.
This article extends our preliminary work [21] on a methodology for threats assessment that
captures the relations between security and emergence in an SoS. The novel contributions we
introduce in this article lie in (i) the introduction of cognitive load as dimension of analysis, (ii)
a revision of the methodology, (iii) its application to a different and more relevant case study,
i.e., investigating the power grid underlying the campus of the University of Twente (Section 4),
(iv), an elaborated description of the tool features (Section 7), and (v) a validation phase with the
involvement of both expert and non-expert users (Section 8).
2 BASICS ON SYSTEMS OF SYSTEMS AND SECURITY
2.1 Systems of Systems
We adopt the definition of SoS from [1]: An SoS is an integration of a finite number of constituent
systems (CS)which are independent and operable andwhich are networked together for a period of
time to achieve a certain higher goal. In this article, we refer to cyber-physical SoSs; for readability,
we will often omit the term “cyber-physical”, whenever it is clear from the context. An SoS is
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composed of both hardware and software systems, communication systems, physical machines,
and humans.
It defines the structure of its composition and the behavior to help reduce the cognitive com-
plexity of the system, or rather the mental effort required in order to understand a given scenario
for the given purpose by an identified user. The time it takes for an average representative from
the intended user group to understand the system is linked to its cognitive complexity [28, 29].
The understanding and analysis of the immense variety of items and their behaviour in the non-
living and living world surrounding us requires appropriate modeling structures that must limit
the overall complexity of a single model and support the step-wise integration of a multitude of
different models. One such widely identified modeling structure is themulti-level hierarchy, where
each level of a hierarchy possesses its unique set of laws. A multi-level hierarchy is a recursive
structure where a system, the whole at the level of interest (the macro-level), can be taken apart
into a set of constituent sub-systems that interact statically or dynamically at the underlying level
(the micro-level). Each of these sub-systems can be viewed as a system of its own when the focus
of observation is shifted from the level above to the underlying one, while this recursive decom-
position ends when the internal structure of a sub-system is of no further interest. As a remark, it
is acknowledged that if there are important systems in the world that are complex without being
hierarchic, they may to a considerable degree escape our observation or understanding [47].
One key characteristic integrated in the paradigm of SoSs is their evolution. Evolution can be
defined as the gradual and progressive process of change or development, resulting from changes
in its environment (primary) or in itself (secondary) [22]. Evolution includes all the changes that
have been introduced to accommodatemodified or brand new requirements bymeans of including,
removing or updating system functions [17]. Large scale Systems-of-Systems (SoSs), such as those
related to infrastructures, e.g., chemical plants, railways, and power grids, tend to be designed for
a long period of usage, e.g., 10 or more years. Over time, the demands and the constraints put on
the system will likely change, as well as the environment in which the system operates [22].
Another fundamental phenomenon of an SoS is emergence [18, 19]. From [18], we define that
a phenomenon of a whole at the macro-level is emergent if and only it is of a new kind with
respect to the non-relational phenomena of any of its proper parts at the micro level (e.g., the CSs).
An emergent phenomenon manifests when CSs act together, and it is not observable by looking
at single CSs separately, and [46] is always associated with levels of a multi-level hierarchy as
expanded above. When it is possible to apply strict verification and validation processes to an SoS,
the amount of emerging phenomena is expected to be very low or even null [48]. In general, in these
SoS, all participating CSs and interactions are well known before the SoS is put into operation. An
example would be the set of control systems in an unmanned rocket, that is a directed SoS, i.e., an
SoS with a central managed purpose and central ownership of all CSs [22]. Instead, in evolutionary
SoSs CSs are collaborating without strict rules or without a single coordinator. Therefore, it is
not easy to perform a satisfactory verification and validation at the macro-level, and emerging
phenomena may arise [46]. This is most likely in acknowledged SoSs, where there are independent
ownership of the CSs (but cooperative agreements among the owners to an aligned purpose),
and collaborative SoSs, that are characterized by the voluntary interactions of independent CSs to
achieve a goal that is beneficial to the individual CS [53].
As an example of emergence, let us consider that in today’s electronic financial markets, an
electronic trader can execute more than 1,000 trading operations in a single second. The actions of
amultitude of human traders and automated trading systems at themicro-level cause the valuation
of the assets at the macro level which in turn influences the actions of the human traders and the
algorithms of the automated trading systems, thus forming causal loops and cascade effects that
can result in emergent misbehavior. In [40], the authors report about such a misbehavior of the
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stock market, called the Flash Crash on May 6, 2010: “. . . in the span of a mere four and half
minutes, the Dow Jones Industrial Average lost approximately 1,000 points.”
The purpose of building a System-of-Systems out of its CSs is to realize new services that go
beyond the services provided by any of the isolated CSs. Emergence is thus at the core of SoS en-
gineering [18]. Emergent phenomena can be of a different nature, either beneficial or detrimental.
Managing emergence is important to realize beneficial emergent phenomena, being usually the
higher goal of an SoS [19]. At the same time, managing emergence is essential to avoid undesired,
possibly unexpected situations generated from CSs interactions that is, detrimental emergent phe-
nomena. For example, when novel evolution or emergent phenomena arise [20], an SoS may be ex-
posed to new security threats [21]. Summarizing, it is necessary to identify detrimental emergence
phenomena in a timely manner, such that proper countermeasures, including security-related, can
be planned.
2.2 Threats Classification in Cyber-Physical Systems of Systems
The CS of an SoS may be subject to hazards and threats that are typical for the specific CS class.
When a CS becomes part of an SoS and it is coupled with other CSs, it can be exposed to a growing
number of hazards and threats. Indeed, exposing an interface to participate in the SoS may intro-
duce new security concerns since it exposes the CS to additional attacks achievable through the
interdependencies [16] among the interconnected and cooperating CSs. Consequently, it is neces-
sary to understand potential failure propagation, attack paths and the impact of security violations
on the connected CSs.
Thus, exposure to security threats in cyber-physical SoS constitutes a challenging topic [35].
When dealing with critical systems or infrastructures, the exploitation of security weaknesses
may lead to serious consequences. There are several examples in recent literature. Just to mention
a few, new generation TVs–Smart TVs–integrate an operating system and an Ethernet connection,
allowing them to offer more features to the users. The embedded operating system may contain
vulnerabilities that could be exploited by an attacker [41], compromising the whole Home Area
Network–the macro-level–or other Smart Appliances that are connected to the Smart TV, which
instead represents the micro-level of such SoS. Biomedical researchers were able to hack defib-
rillators, reprogramming the compromised device to shut down intermittently, and to deliver po-
tentially fatal levels of electricity [37], while outages in power grids are often due to malicious
activities [38].
Thus, taking into account malicious actions as intrusions into communications and control sys-
tems becomes a critical step during both the design and the assessment of cyber-physical SoS,
especially when they provide critical services [36]. To such extent, several threat analysis and risk
assessment approaches were proposed, providing methodologies and tools to support the identifi-
cation of risks also considering their societal impact [39]. Threats–and consequently risks, which
are a function in the degree of likelihood and impact of a threat [10]–can be classified in two dif-
ferent groups, depending on the way they threaten a system. In more detail, we propose a distinc-
tion between emerging threats, and structural threats. Emerging threats are events originated by
malicious attackers who exploit interactions among different subsystems constituting the cyber-
physical SoS. Examples include, but are not limited to, communication interception (e.g., man in
the middle), device compromisation, and tunneling attacks that are made possible by the intro-
duction of new components or new functionalities, that create novel ways of interaction within
the SoS. Structural threats, instead, refer to the attacks that target a specific component without
considering its interaction with other entities of the SoS. Examples may include a physical attack
on a component (e.g., sensors tampering), or exploiting a firewall vulnerability to penetrate the
internal network of a company.
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3 RELATEDWORK
Most of the approaches supporting the achievement of security requirements aim at conducting
threat analyses focusing only on static cyber-physical systems. Depending on the specific system,
available standards lack strict guidance that domain experts should follow when dealing with
evolving SoS and, therefore, with possible emergent behaviors. As example, in the Smart Grid
domain, IEC and NIST respectively defined a roadmap [24] and a guideline document [25] but
they do not provide any standard methodology for conducting cyber-threat analysis of energy
control systems. In addition, the NIST 800-30 standard for conducting risk assessments [10], along
with the NISTIR 7628 [11] standard on Smart Grids, provide a consolidated background to such
type of analysis but they do not provide guidelines or methodologies amenable for supporting
evolution and emergent SoS properties.
3.1 Switch in Threat Analysis Focus
It is generally acknowledged that, depending on the specific system or scenario, the focus of the
threat analysis might vary over time. As [4] points out, both the threat landscape and the assets to
be protected can change. Previously, the topic of considering the threat landscape was addressed
from the attack perspective. For instance, the TREsPASS project constructed the attack navigator
map as an approach to reduce the complexity of systems [13]. Specifically, this constitutes an effort
to bridge the gap between complexity of real systems and the limits of human perception by using
a concept familiar to all of us, namely spatial navigation. Key features aiming to reduce complexity
are attacker profiles and attack pattern libraries (APL).
3.2 Threat Analysis in Evolving Cyber-Physical Systems
Even though some approaches do consider evolving scenarios and aim at providing different type
of assurances, they often do not consider (safety and) security. For instance, the approach pre-
sented in [5] considers evolving scenarios in detecting recurring software failure patterns. The
authors show the utility of considering evolution concerns in the detection process. However, that
approach does not concentrate on how the system evolves and how this may affect the process
of detecting threats and corresponding mitigation strategies. Evolution properties are considered
in [42], where authors explore potential sources of systemic risks in complex SoS by analyzing
unique failure modes in a nonlinear dynamic multi-objective sequential decision-making process.
The main focus of [42] is to ignore the decisions that may reduce the safety margin of a specific
CS within the SoS to withstand unexpected external perturbations due to the interdependencies
among CSs. Additionally, in [32], the author lists seven issues and recommendations for companies
willing to adopt risk management mechanisms in their SoS-based systems.
However, other solutions do assist the analysis of security threats in evolving scenarios but they
do not support the complete threat analysis process [6, 7]. The approach in [6] provides security-
based assurances in case of evolution of the basic system functionalities. A monitoring infrastruc-
ture alerts users in case they are working in an unsafe zone by applying run-time monitoring
system properties, ultimately estimating an acceptable probability of the system operating satis-
factorily. However, the latter does not support the enactment of security requirements according
to the monitored security threats. The approach presented in [7] supports modeling and analy-
sis of complex networks to mitigate security threats by also enabling the application of security
measures. Differences among network states are detected to reveal points of variations, thus trig-
gering updates of both threat lists and corresponding security policies. In [8], the authors present
a process for threat analysis of evolving systems by specializing the risk management principles
and guidelines of the ISO 31000 standard [31]. Traceability between risk and target system models
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is kept to manage evolving security requirements. Nevertheless, the evolutionary threat analysis
approaches as [7, 8] are not thought of as SoSs since they do not explicitly consider emergent
phenomena originated by evolutions, thus they cannot primarily focus on risks associated on in-
formation flows and control among autonomous and interacting CSs.
3.3 Our Contribution
Within the community of experts in power system security, the problems arising from system
interdependency stressed the need to extend the power system transient analysis with new ap-
proaches able to deal with cascading contingency chains [26]. The intensive networking at the
core of advanced grid control favors the occurrence of cascading phenomena in the power sys-
tem, which emerge from the relation among different grid components. Thus, novel approaches
tailored to identify and analyze such emerging phenomena constitute one of the frontiers that are
currently requiring attention. This acquires relevance when dealing with threat identification and
risk assessment processes, since emerging phenomena may expose the system to novel threats
that are not easily detectable otherwise.
This article contributes by reducing the gaps we identified to threat analysis process for evolving
systems, considering Smart Grids as a case study for both qualitative and quantitative evaluations.
With respect to the state-of-the-art works listed above, we state how to generate automatically
lists of threats for a complex and evolving cyber-physical SoS by emphasizing the identification of
emergent phenomena and related threats. This is intended to fill the lack of details on evolutionary
threat analysis processes and support we noticed by examining both risk assessment and Smart
Grid standards [10, 11] and research papers discussing on threat analysis approaches for evolving
systems [5, 6]. By providing a tool-supported methodology to SoS threat analysis, we aim at reduc-
ing the cognitive load required from SoS administrator, consequently leading to (i) performance
improvement [29] and (ii) reduction of potential manual errors [30].
4 MOTIVATING SCENARIO: SMART GRID
As discussed in the Introduction, we consider Smart Grids as reference SoS for evaluating our
methodology and the supporting tool. Smart Grids are power grids which integrate in a cost-
efficient way the behavior and actions of all users connected to it–producers, consumers and those
that do both–in order to ensure a sustainable power system with high levels of quality, safety, and
security of supply [12]. These systems are subject to topology or policy updates, or rather evolution-
ary steps, which evolve functional requirements possibly leading to expose novel security breaches
that can be exploited by malicious attackers. Once an evolutionary step is defined, city planners
or stakeholders have to deal with the novel threats introduced by that topology or policy changes.
Our case study investigates the grid underlying an area of the campus of University of Twente
in Enschede, the Netherlands. We used this grid as the case study since most of the students who
participated in our experiments (Section 8) attended courses at that university. The students sug-
gested possible future evolutions of an existing grid model, acting the role of a city planner who
is tasked to figure out how the campus will develop in the next few years. To assist them in this
process, the students were introduced to the idea that the future grid can be characterized by
two aspects: (i) smartness, if the grid incorporates many smart components or not and (ii) regula-
tions, whether the grid operates under strict regulations or not (highly regulated/low regulated).
Figure 1.S1 represents a high-level model of the current campus grid topology. This Initial Scenario
consists of a power grid supporting the Smart Homes (SH) energy consumption, their internet con-
nectivity through a shared Access Point (AP), the functional activities of an Office (O), a Data Centre
(BDC), and a Hospital (H), all requiring energy, and finally a Carbon Power Plant (PP) producing
the energy required for the other constituent systems. A Mid-Low Voltage Substation (SS) supplies
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Fig. 1. First (S1), second (S2) and third (S3) evolutionary steps for the motivating Smart Grid scenario of the
campus of University of Twente.
low voltage to SH. The data connection (line connected to the AP in Figure 1) exists between few
buildings, enabling smart controls such as the advanced monitoring of energy consumption.
Based on the Initial Scenario, the students suggested the two possible subsequent evolutionary
steps we depicted in Figure 1.S2 and Figure 1.S3. Since the number of university employees is
expected to increase, the students suggested Adding Resources (see Figure 1.S2), or rather new SH
components representing more housing facilities for students. This also implies a greater energy
demand, which is balanced by adding a Photo Voltaic Generation (PVG) source within the campus.
The usage of green energy, which is encouraged by local authorities in the Netherlands, motivated
also the last evolution step (Decarbonisation in Figure 1.S3), where the carbon power plant was
replaced with another PV source.
We consider the employed grid model to be a motivating example, which we built with the aid
of both students and technical personnel working at the University of Twente. Certainly, both
students and technical personnel did not know all the insights of the grid topology, ultimately
leading to building a grid model containing several high-level approximations. This motivating
scenario is used as a case study to validate the methodology proposed in this article.
5 PROPOSED THREAT ANALYSIS FOR AN EVOLVING SOS
In order to provide safety and security requirements for SoSs, it is essential to analyze the inter-
dependency regulating the flow of information among entailed CSs. As remarked in Section 3.3,
interactions among CSs may generate emerging phenomena, which represent possible security
threats and damages.
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Fig. 2. Methodology for evolutionary threat analysis.
The methodology for the evolutionary threat analysis proposed in this article adopts the guide-
lines defined from NIST in the SP 800-30 [10] regarding both the approach to be followed and
the main steps to be performed for validating the threat analysis. In particular, we exploited an
asset-oriented approach as defined in the NIST standard by identifying (i) first, critical or updated
assets of the SoS and then (ii) the related threat events, i.e., the internal behavior of a CS and their
possible interactions. In contrast to the NIST standard, we supported an incremental threat identi-
fication process carried out after the SoS evolution through evolutionary steps. The methodology
uses a threats list and a set of mitigations, which need to be instantiated depending on the specific
target system.
5.1 The Methodology
Considering each evolution step as a set of addition, removal, or change of assets, our approach
identifies the threats which can arise due to this scenario’s evolution. Consequently, the mitigation
strategies to apply/remove are identified according to their threats traceability. The steps of our
methodology (see Figure 2) are:
• Setup/Evolve the Scenario. The initial scenario (1.A) or the evolution step (1.B) is loaded and
merged with the previous scenario (if any). The current scenario is then analyzed to detect
new or removed assets, e.g., the addition of SH and PVG in the “Adding Resources” scenario
in Figure 1.S2;
• Identifying Structural Threats. Considering only the updated assets, we look at the consid-
ered threats list to understand if the updated assets carry one or more intrinsic (structural)
threats, which are introduced in the scenario with the addition of the new assets;
• Identifying Emerging Threats. Here we investigate the interactions between the novel or
removed assets and the others in the scenario, identifying threats due to complex emerging
behaviors, e.g., two components of a power grid competing against each other for acquiring
energy;
• Merge and Mitigate. The novel structural and emerging threats are merged and added to
the partial results of the process. Following this, each threat is linked to its corresponding
mitigations.
Once all the evolution steps are analyzed, all the results coming from each iteration of the pro-
cess are merged and added to the identified threat list, which contains information about threat
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Table 1. Threats Identified by Applying the Methodology to the Motivating Smart Grid Scenarios
Threats Mitigations
# Name Type CS Motivation # Names
14
Compromise
software of
organizational
critical
information
systems.
ST PP
Adversary inserts malware or
otherwise corrupts critical
internal organizational
information systems.
4, 5, 19
Security Assessment and
Authorization,
Configuration
Management, Smart Grid
Information System and
Information Integrity
32
Earthquake at
primary facility
STR SS
Earthquake of
organization-defined magnitude at
primary facility makes facility
inoperable.
- -
18
Conduct Denial
of Service (DoS)
attacks
EM AP, H
Adversary attempts to make an
Internet-accessible resource
unavailable to intended users, or
prevent the resource from
functioning efficiently or at all,
temporarily or indefinitely.
4,6,10
Security Assessment and
Authorization, Continuity
of Operations, Smart Grid
Information System
Development and
Maintenance
events concerning (i) the threat type, (ii) its nature, either structural or emerging, (iii) affected
CSs, and (iv) corresponding mitigations strategies.
It is worth noting that since it is very difficult to link a threat eventwith a reasonable quantitative
evaluation of its impact and likelihood in such a generic context, we will not weigh the degree
of harm and likelihood of threats’ occurrences. These quantities can be added by the security
experts that examine a specific scenario, knowing all its assumptions and the critical factors that
are contributing to the occurrence of the threats. As a result, our focus in this study is not on risks;
instead, we focus on the identification of threats and their corresponding mitigation strategies.
5.2 Applying the Methodology to the Smart Grid Scenario
Based on the Smart Grid scenario, we show how the methodology can be applied to support threat
analysis of an SoS. As reference threat and mitigation lists, we considered the work done in the
context of the IRENE project [34]. Here the authors of the cyber-security analysis of smart grids
[12] derived a list of 38 threats to the urban grid mainly due to cyber-security (i.e., 29 cyber-
security threats and 9 related either to environmental and accidental threats) based on the NIST
800-30 [10] guidelines. We chose to adopt this reduced list instead of the original one since at such
high abstraction level it is not necessary to have detailed information about specific categories of
threats, e.g., we cannot distinguish between a Denial of Service (DoS) attack and a Distributed DoS).
Moreover, in IRENE, each threat is mapped with a set of possible mitigations, which are extracted
from the NISTIR 7628 [11] security requirements. This set of mitigations is particularly suitable
in the cyber domain; depending on the specific focus of the threat analysis (e.g., human faults,
environmental), the set of mitigations can change.
As an example, Table 1 shows a partial outcome of applying the proposed methodology to the
scenarios presented in Section 4. Each row shows a numeric identifier of the threat as shown in the
IRENE threat list [12], the name, the type (either structural or emerging), the involved CSs, a textual
motivation and several linked mitigations with their identifiers. Two of the threats presented in
the table are intrinsic to PP and SS; therefore are classified as structural (ST), differing from the last
one that is classified as emerging (EM). The “DoS” threat, which emerges from the interconnection
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between two components, represents an attacker that uses the public AP–which is networked
with other components–to conduct such an attack against the hospital (H). We can also notice
how the “earthquake” threat affecting the SS component is not linked to mitigations. Since this is
an environmental threat, we could not match it with any of the available mitigations since these
are explicitly directed to cyber-security threats.
6 MODEL FOR THREAT ANALYSIS
Following a feature engineering perspective [15], we describe an evolving SoS as one which pro-
vides a set of features at each evolutionary step. A feature is defined as f = (CS,T ,M ), where
• CS is the set of required constituent systems to provide the functionalities. In a given sce-
nario S, each element cs ∈ CS contains a set of structural threats defined as cs .T S ;
• T ε entails the set of emerging threats;
• M is the set of mitigation strategies which have to be activated in a given scenario Si to
mitigate the threats in (∪x ∈csx .T S ) ∪T ε .
We define the set of scenarios S = {S0, S1, . . . , Sn }, each represented as a combination of features
that have to be provided by the SoS. A set of emerging threats T ε
Sx
arising among CSs belonging
to multiple features, corresponds to each scenario Sx .
6.1 Evolutionary Threat Analysis
The SoS evolution process is started by the SoS administrator who desires to change a set of
features to satisfy modification in the user needs. This process is formalized by Algorithm 1 de-
scribing the evolutionary threat analysis from the current to the target scenario. The algorithm
determines the current set of threats affecting the evolved SoS and it determines their correspond-
ing mitigation strategies. The first step consists of computing the set of features to be added (line
1) and to discarded (line 2). Following this, it computes the set of threats that arise in the evolved
scenario by considering structuralT Starget (lines 4–6) and emergingT
ϵ
target (line 7) threats and it col-
lects their corresponding mitigationsMtarget (line 8). For each feature to be added, it collects the set
of structural TS,+ (lines 11–13) and emerging threats Tϵ ,+ (line 14) by neglecting the ones that have
been already mitigated in the current scenario, i.e., T Scurr and T
ϵ
curr. For each feature to be deleted,
the algorithm computes the set of structural TS,- (lines 17–19) and emergingT ϵ,− (line 20) threats
that are no longer present by neglecting the ones which are still in the target scenario T Starget and
T ϵtarget. The next step consists of updating the already computed emerging threats to be added and
deleted with the ones arising from the features interactions, i.e., T ε
Starget
(lines 22–23). Finally, the
algorithm applies function Mitigate: 2T → 2M which, taking as input the set of threats in T, de-
termines the corresponding mitigation strategies to be applied among the ones in M. To compute
the required strategies, we consider those necessary for the additional set of structural TS,+ and
emerging Tϵ ,+ threats, by neglecting the ones already implemented in the current scenario Mcurr
(line 24). The mitigations to be discarded are computed as those required by threats in TS,- and Tϵ ,-
by neglecting those that have to be included in the target scenario Mtarget (lines 25–26).
6.2 Analyzing the Smart Grid Scenario
Based on the “Initial” scenario in Figure 1.S1, we identified, among others, the following set of
features. FHousehold is the household energy consumption, FInternet provides the household internet
connectivity, FOffice represents the working activity of the office, and finally FCarbonProd is the carbon
energy production due to the power plant. Table 2 reports for each feature the set of required CSs,
their affecting threats, both structural and emergent, and the amount of corresponding mitigation
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Table 2. Threats Related to Features of “Initial” Scenario
Feature CSs #Threats Threat Listing #Mitigations
FHousehold SH 12 {1,3,4,6,9,11,15,23,24,29,30,33} 37
FInternet SH, AP 14 {4,9,11,14,16,18,19,23,24,29,30,31,33,37} 44
FOffice O 23 {2,3,4,5,7,8,9,12,13,14,19,20,22,23,25,26,29,30,32,33,34,35,37} 51
FCarbonProd PP 16 {3,5,6,7,8,14,19,22,26,27,28,30,32,33,34,35} 38
ALGORITHM 1: Evolutionary Threat Analysis
Require: The current scenario Scurr affected by the structural T
S
curr
and emerging T ∈
curr
threats,
their corresponding mitigation strategiesMcurr and the scenario to achieve Starget
Ensure: The mitigation strategies to addM+and removeM−
1: δ +
F
= Starget − Scurr
2: δ −
F
= Starget − Scurr
3: for all feature f ∈ Starget do
4: for all cs ∈ f .CS do
5: T starget = T
s
target ∪ cs .T s
6: end for
7: T ∈target = T ∈target ∪ f .T ∈
8: Mtarget = Mtarget ∪ f .M
9: end for
10: for all feature f ∈ δ +
F
do
11: for all cs ∈ f .CS do
12: T s,+ = T s,+ ∪ (cs .T s −T Scurr)
13: end for
14: T ∈,+ = T ∈,+ ∪ (cs .T ∈ −T ∈curr)
15: end for
16: for all feature f ∈ δ −
F
do
17: for all feature cs ∈ f .CS do
18: T s,− = T s,− ∪ (cs .T s − T Starget)
19: end for
20: T ∈,− = T ∈,− ∪ ( f .T ∈ − T ∈target )
21: end for
22: T ∈,+ = T ∈,+ ∪ T ∈
Starget
23: T ∈,− = T ∈,− ∪ (T ∈
Scurr
−T ∈
Starget
)
24: M+ = Mitiдate (T s,+ ∪ T ∈,+) −Mcurr
25: Mtarget = Mtarget ∪ Mitiдate (T ∈Starget )
26: M− = Mitiдate (T s,− ∪ T ∈,−) −Mtarget
strategies. For example, regarding FCarbonProd, threat 14 consists of unauthorized access to the crit-
ical control software of the PP (see Table 1). The corresponding mitigations are the management
of configuration (mitigation 5 in [12]), monitoring facilities, and malware detection policies, i.e.,
mitigations 4, 19. Emergent threats may involve features FInternet and FOffice, considering that em-
ployees can get access to their organizational data from home. Under this assumption, attackers
can perform sniffing (threat 6 in [12]), communication interception, e.g., threat 15, 21 (Man in the
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Table 3. Threats and Novel Features of “AddingResources” Scenario
Feature CSs # Threats Threat Listing # Mitigations
FGreenProd PVG 16 {3,5,6,7,8,14,19,22,26,27,28,30,32,33,34,35} 38
Table 4. Evolutionary Threat Analysis (Smart Grid scenario)
Evolution Step #F+ #F- #T+ #T- #Tϵ,+ #Tϵ,- #M+ #M-
(Baseline) Initial 6 - 194 - 75 - 578 -
Initial→ AddingResources 3 0 77 0 53 0 139 0
AddingResources→ Decarbonisation 1 1 23 23 5 5 47 47
Initial→ Decarbonisation 4 1 100 23 58 5 186 87
Middle - MiM) or they can exploit tunnels or unexpired sessions that the employee did not close
properly (threat 10). A possiblemitigation to these attack is to implementmitigation 18 “Smart Grid
Information System and Communication Protection”, aimed at defining specific policies or protocols
to close all unused connections.
Switching from “Initial” to “AddingResources” scenario by implementing the evolution step re-
quires an additional set of features to be considered. We report in Table 3 the novel features to
be added. This includes the FGreenProd feature, which describes the renewable energy production
and it is the unique novel feature arising from the current scenario. It can be noted that, con-
sidering the threats list we adopted, the threats related to the FCarbonProd feature are the same of
the FGreenProd feature. Both features are related to components (PP and PVG) that provide energy
to the connected buildings, and they are exposed to the same subset of threats. In addition, this
evolution step describes an increasing number of students, which results in the building of more
houses. This is described with the FHousehold feature, which we summarized in Table 2. In this case,
threats related to FHousehold are duplicated, since they refer to different SH components. The last
evolution step completes the “Decarbonisation” of the area of the campus described in our Smart
Grid scenario. More detailed, the carbon power plant is replaced by a PV power plant, meaning
that a FGreenProd feature replaces an existing FCarbonProd one. This completes the 2-step evolution of
the initial scenario that we analyzed using our methodology.
Lastly, Table 4 summarizes how the sets used in Algorithm 1 change through the application of
the methodology to the scenarios we used as case study. In the table, we can see how the features
(sets F+, F-) related to the scenarios are evolving, by impacting both the amount of structural
(T+, T-) and emerging (Tϵ ,+, Tϵ ,-) threats and the linked mitigations (M+, M- sets). As mentioned
before, by switching from “AddingResources” to “Decarbonisation” scenario, we are removing the
FCarbonProd feature and adopting the FGreenProd one, which have the same amount of related threats
(16) and mitigations (38). In Table 4, we can observe that this change leads to the removal of and
consequently to the addition of 23 structural threats, 5 emerging threats, and 47 mitigations. These
amounts, e.g., 47 mitigations, are higher than the ones related to single features since removing
or adding a feature involves the removal or the addition of electric circuitry, e.g., wires, that are
used to connect buildings to the existing grid. These components, along with the buildings, can
be targeted by cyber-attacks and therefore have their related threats and mitigations, affecting the
size of the T and M sets.
6.3 Scenario-Based Analysis of Threats Distribution
Given the set of input scenarios that are affected by the set of structural and emerging threats,
we are interested in exploring the distribution of such threats across the scenarios. It is important
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Fig. 3. Threats’ distribution in the Smart Grid scenario.
to detect which threats affect all the input scenarios and which are very specific since they only
affect just a few possibly evolutionary scenarios. Having such information, an SoS administrator
is able to evaluate the relevance of threats thus having a decision-making support to drive the
SoS evolution. To this end, we propose to apply the Formal Concepts Analysis (FCA) [9] in order
to identify groups of objects sharing common attributes. FCA supports the definition of a formal
context C = (Obj, Att, Rel) where Obj is the set of objects, Att is the set of attributes and Rel ⊆
Obj ✕ Att is the relation between objects and attributes. In our case, objects are the scenarios,
while corresponding attributes are the set of relevant threats in each scenario. By adopting an
FCA analysis we can easily know which are the scenarios affected by a certain threat and conse-
quently detecting if some threats are very frequent, i.e., appearing in almost all the scenarios, or
not, i.e., appearing just in a few scenarios. This implies two important facts. First, scenarios can
be put in a hierarchical relationship depending on the impacting threats: a scenario is a child of
another scenario if all the threats affecting the father scenario are affecting also the child. Another
implication regards a possible association of costs to the implementation of mitigations. Having
such a FCA structure allows the identification of which threats are changing from a scenario and
another, and consequently how much money is required to implement new mitigations in order
to avoid or mitigate novel threats.
The FCA output resulting from the application of our methodology to the scenarios in Section 4
is depicted in Figure 3 and expanded in Section 7.2.
7 TOOL SUPPORT
Themethodology presented in this paper has been implemented in a supporting tool alongwith the
proposed algorithm determining the variation of mitigation strategies and the scenario-based dis-
tribution analysis. It makes use of the Colibri-Java FCA API1 to analyze the distribution of threats.
The tool takes as input the evolutionary scenarios defined in terms of features and the mapping
between threats and their corresponding required mitigation strategies. A list of structural threats
related to each component is also provided as input, along with information regarding threats that
may emerge in the grid. For example, an attacker that may want to get into a network may need to
access a public access point (see AP component in Figure 1), and use this component as a starting
point to exploit vulnerabilities and conduct tunneling or MiM attacks. Such information, if exists,
is linked to each threat in our list, and is used by the tool to identify possible emerging threats
by analyzing the grid scenario that is given as input. As a remark, the tool is meant to discover
possible emerging threats that will impact the grid scenario, while the structural threats are given
as input and simply reported in our analysis for completeness.
1https://code.google.com/archive/p/colibri-java.
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Lastly, according to the methodology it implements, the tool outputs a list of threats that may
arise at each evolutionary step, in association with a suggested set of mitigations the SoS admin-
istrator may want to apply.
7.1 Tool Characteristics
Inputs. The tool requires the following inputs: (i) a list of threats, (ii) a list of threat categories,
(iii) a list of mitigations, (iv) a list of grid components, (v) the mapping between components and
structural threats, (vi) information about emerging threats, and (vii) a (set of) scenario including a
grid topology. Concisely, the list of threats and threat categories define the threat model, or rather
the threats that the user is taking into account for the specific study, e.g., cyber-security or envi-
ronmental. The mitigations are a set of strategies that can be instantiated and implemented on a
specific grid to mitigate or avoid the detrimental effects of threats. This information is therefore
used to analyze a grid scenario, which can be either brand new or an evolution of a previously
analyzed one. In both cases, the grid scenario is defined as a grid topology that is composed of
the components in the components list, complemented with several assumptions about the city
scenario under investigation, e.g., seismic zone, prone to terrorism.
Outputs. The output of the tool is provided both in terms of a list of identified threats and a FCA
file. In particular, some files listing the threats identified in each grid scenario given as input are
provided, with several mitigations that can be applied to each of the identified threats. Moreover,
consider threats happening in a scenario as a formal relation between two components, i.e., threats
and scenarios allow viewing the results of the threat analysis as a FCA structure. This helps define
a hierarchy for the involved grid scenarios. The hierarchy is based on the threats that can arise in
each scenario: a grid scenario is an ancestor of another one if its possible threats are a subset of
threats that occur in the child scenario.
Code, Language, and Interfaces.We chose Java as reference platform since it is not OS dependent
and since other tools in the IRENE [34] toolset were developed with the same language. Never-
theless, the tool doesn’t have a graphical interface since it is intended to be used in cooperation
with other tools by the toolset above that offer a graphical user interface. However, the tool can
be considered as a standalone resource that has its inputs and outputs into text files. This allows a
simple integration with other tools that can read and write the input and output files to tune the
preferences of the threat analysis tool according to their actual needs. Code quality was checked
using FindBugs [27], which was tuned to identify the following bug categories: security flaws, bad
practices, dodgy code, and multi-threading correctness.
Computational Complexity. The tool implements a simple methodology; consequently, the com-
plexity of the tool itself does not require deep performance analysis. However, during the CPU-
intensive phase–while threats for each evolution step are listed–the tool executes the most expen-
sive tasks in dedicated threads, to not lock the main thread responsible to collect the outcomes of
the created threads. This will increase the performances of the tool in workstations where several
(physical or virtual) CPUs are available. The management of such threads is left to the Java sched-
uler, which runs a preemptive priority-based algorithm. Summarizing, the tool performs satisfacto-
rily with the scenario’s inputs, given that it is polynomial with respect to the inputs. Consequently,
we expect to have an acceptable scalability to larger scale Smart Grids.
7.2 Executing the Tool
We applied the tool to the Smart Grid scenario introduced in Section 4. In particular, Figure 3
represents the distribution of threats across the scenarios of our case study. Each node of the
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figure represents parts of scenarios sharing the exact same set of threats. The upper-level node
contains the threats affecting all the scenarios, i.e., the ones that should be always mitigated. On
the contrary, the lower-level node contains all the threats that are affecting at least one scenario. In
our case, 56.4% of threats affect all the three scenarios. “Decarbonisation” scenario contains 93.4%
of threats among which 86.8% are also present in “AddingResources” scenario. “Initial” scenario
contains the 63.0% of threats, thus it is the scenario affected by the lower number of threats. Further
details on the tool can be found in [43].
8 USER ASSESSMENT
The validation of the proposed methodology and the tool was first performed during a risk man-
agement workshop at the CuriousU summer school at University of Twente, and then during a
stakeholder workshop conducted at Power Networks Demonstration Centre (PNDC) in Glasgow,
Scotland. Students attending the first workshop (student workshop) are not experts in the field.
However, as can be seen later, the questionnaires are mainly directed to assess features such as
perceived difficulties in key steps of the process, clarity of the overall process, and perceived use-
fulness of the overall process. Since we expect RA results being shared with other non-domain
experts, e.g., city planners, to progress with the process of collaborative planning, these aspects
need to be very clear to everyone, motivating the choice of non-expert people as user-base of our
assessment. Differently to student workshop, the stakeholder workshop was focused on gaming
simulations. The goal of this workshop was to assess scalability of the methods and tools devel-
oped in the IRENE project (including the threat analysis tool described in Section 7) by taking
advantage of the expertise of the three stakeholders who attended the workshop.
8.1 Student Workshop
In the student workshop, we asked participants to rate and discuss: (i) the structure and possible
evolutions of the power grid underlying the university campus (related to Step 1 of the methodol-
ogy in Figure 2) and (ii) the emerging threats identified by the Evolutionary Threat Analysis tool,
which are targeted by Step 3 of our methodology.
The novelty of our methodology does not regard the identification of structural threats, i.e.,
Step 2 of our methodology, as this research topic is already quite advanced. In addition, we did
not concentrate on mitigations, i.e., Step 4 of the methodology, as mitigations are domain-specific
and they can be evaluated only by experts in a given city scenario. In our experiments, we
concentrated on (i) assessing the proposed methodology, i.e., Step 1-related and Step 3 of the
methodology and (ii) studying the cognitive load requested to fulfill the task with and without
using the associated automated threat identification tool.
In order to assess the methodology, we asked participants to rate the perceived difficulty of
defining a grid evolution step, in terms of difficulty to select a future grid scenario and of difficulty
to select future grid components, as well as rating the perceived agreement with the evolved grid
produced. We asked those questions in questionnaire Q1. In addition, in questionnaire Q3, we
asked students to (i) rate the clarity of the overall process and (ii) report the perceived usefulness
of the overall process. We describe below the object of study, treatment details and measurement
design, finally discussing the results we obtained.
8.1.1 Object of Study. Our population consisted of 18 BSc and MSc students. The students had
mixed backgrounds, but shared interest in risk assessment. It is worth noting that skills and ex-
perience of these students can be hardly compared to the expected expertise of users of this tool,
e.g., security experts or decision makers. However, several similarities allow us to consider the ex-
periment to be relevant to the study. Specifically, students and real decision makers might not be
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familiar with our approach in particular or practices of cybersecurity risk assessment in general.
In addition, underlying cognitive mechanisms and group dynamics are shared. Furthermore, the
students will also allow assessing features related to the clarity of the process and results. Since
we expect RA results to be shared with other non-domain experts, e.g., city planners, for the pur-
poses of collaborative planning, it is important that the outputs of the threat analysis are easily
understood.
The students were not pre-selected, neither did they choose to follow one treatment or the other.
All participants were exposed simultaneously to the same treatment, which is described next.
8.1.2 Treatment Design. The validation session was performed as part of a full-day cybersecu-
rity workshop at University of Twente. During the workshop, participants were first introduced to
the topic of information security risk assessment and cyber-threats to urban grids. Afterwards, a
simplified model of the grid (see Figure 1.S1) underlying the campus of University of Twente was
demonstrated.
Participants were asked to work on the first step of our methodology: evolve the grid. To do so,
they discussed possible future grid scenarios and then suitable grid components, finally agreeing
on the evolutionary scenarios depicted in Figure 1.S2 and Figure 1.S3. At the end of the grid evo-
lution exercise, each participant received a questionnaire about the task they just performed, i.e.,
questionnaire Q1 in the next subsection. Following that, the participants were introduced to an
informal qualitative risk assessment tool ArgueSecure [23]. The goal of this step was to encourage
them to identify risk on their own and familiarize themselves with the topic of risk identification.
The participants then filled in a questionnaire on usability and utility of the ArgueSecure tool, i.e.,
questionnaire Q2, which is less relevant to this work and is mentioned for the completeness of this
subsection. Therefore, the collected data are not reported in this article.
Following that, workshop participants were introduced to the tool described in Section 7. The
performance of the tool for analyzing the same evolved campus grid depicted in Figure 1 was
demonstrated. In addition, an overview of the emerging threats identified by the tool was given.
Furthermore, workshop participants rated the tool according to their impression and resulting
risks (questionnaire Q3). Finally, they documented perceived differences between conducting and
informal risk assessment (on the example of ArgueSecure) and using an automated threat identi-
fication tool, such as the tool described in this article (questionnaire Q4). The design of the ques-
tionnaires and their results obtained are described and discussed in the following subsections.
8.1.3 Measurement Design and Data Collected. We operationalized the cognitive load required
to use our tool in terms of the following indicators: perceived difficulty of using the tool and
perceived duration of using the tool. In addition, we focused on perceived quality of the results,
measured via Q3. Quality of the results is further decomposed into perceived understandability,
correctness and completeness, also measured via Q3. All of the indicators listed above were
rated on a 5-point semantic Linkert [33] scale, i.e., ‘Very Easy’, score 1, to ‘Very Hard’, score
5. The participants filled-in each questionnaire individually. Lastly, participants were asked to
describe–using free text–how they would improve upon the proposed methodology, as well as
discuss how the proposed methodology compares with performing an informal risk assessment
with ArgueSecure (see Q4).
After the first round of experiments, 17 participants returned Q1 questionnaires. Details of ques-
tions are described in Section 8.4, while answers are shown in Table 5 (we numberedQx.y questions
corresponding to x questionnaire with cumulative numbering y of the question itself). In total, 18
questionnaires were collected after Q3. The answers are described in Table 6.
The open question of Q4.21 (What do you think are the strengths and weaknesses of each of the
two presented approaches) resulted in the following remarks:
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Table 5. Answers toQuestionnaire Q1. Q1.1, Q1.2, Q1.3, Q1.5 are scored from 1 - Completely Disagree - to
5 - Completely Agree, while Q1.4 and Q1.6 are OpenQuestions
Code Question Text Answers
Q1.1 Agreement with the future grid
Average (Avg) 3.52,
Standard Deviation (Std) 0.51
Q1.2
Difficulty of selecting a future
grid scenario using
smartness/regulations categories
Avg 3.35,
Std 0.61
Q1.3
Are there more scenarios than
smartness/regulations categories
7 Yes,
10 No
Q1.4
Remarks about scenario, if
question 3=.T:
‘Culture’ (Participant P.1)
‘Building energy efficiency’ (P.8)
‘Considering feasibility (economic) and social acceptability’ (P.9)
‘Intermediate one, not only low-high’ (P.12)
‘+ houses; electric cars; solar panels’ (P.13)
‘users (traffic? industry? household?)’ (P.16)
Q1.5
Difficulty to select grid
components based on the scenario
Avg 2.47,
Std 0.94
Q1.6
If the difficulty >= 3, please
explain why (Open question):
‘due to technology policy’ (Participant 1)
‘very unpredictable’ (P.9)
‘not aware of the progress of current technologies’ (P.10)
‘by analysis of recent trends this components are the most
expected’ (P.13)
‘I think any of these can be different from country to country,
e.g., politics and economics. Especially for ’solar’ solution, I’m
not that optimistic, as it brings in a lot of pollution during
production’ (P.16)
Table 6. Answers toQuestionnaire Q3
Code Question Text Answers
Q3.14
Difficulty to identify threats
with the developed tool
Avg 3.28,
Std 1.02
Q3.15 Time needed for a formal RA 3.61, 0.78
Q3.16 Understandability of the result 3.28, 0.96
Q3.17 Correctness of the result 3.67, 0.49
Q3.18 Completeness of the result 3.83, 0.71
Q3.19
How would you improve the
tool
‘Easier’ (Participant 12);
‘Consideration of external factors, showing the level of threat of
a particular entity’ (P.13);
‘The language was technical for non-expert in the matter, should
be given in customers language not experts language. We know
basic stuff’ (P.15); ‘Introduce a standard procedure that can be
applied to different system’ (P.16)
Q3.20 Consider a 3-step process: construct grid model; select future components; identify emerging threats
Q3.20a
Process is clear Avg. 3.5, Std 0.86
Q3.20b
Process is useful 3.83, 0.99
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—“[the tool] may find more risks than [informal risk assessment]”;
—“Weakness: A lot of clarity needs to be laid on how Structural and Emerging Threats are
depicted. Strength: Effective in terms of time, cost, and effort”;
—“Weakness: (1) No way to rank threats, (2) Does not consider external factors. Strength:
(1) Shows all possible connections, (2) Shows new ideas”;
—“Weakness: Not easily interpretable. Strength: Precise calculation, more computational
(more component?)”;
—“[formal assessment using the tool is] more concrete and systematic but covers some of the
unseen but possible risks.”
8.1.4 Summary of Results and Discussions. The data reported above reflect Q1, which is related
to Step 1 of the methodology in Figure 2, and Q3, which focuses more on the tool and on the
identification of threats. Answers related to Q1 indicate that participants agreed with the design
of the future campus grid they constructed (participants marked ‘completely agree’ in Q1.1). This
can be interpreted as no significant objections against both the initial and the evolved grid con-
figurations being raised. Therefore, we assume that due to the lack of possible objections, such
potential disagreement did not heavily influence other answers. Participants indicated some dif-
ficultly to choose a particular scenario (Q1.2) and they felt that some aspects of the future might
be accounted in addition to smartness and regulatory dichotomies that are described in Section 4
(see Q1.3 and Q1.4). The task of selecting grid components was perceived as being relatively easy
(rated as 2.47 out of 5, as shown in Q1.5 and Q1.6). Together, answers to questionnaire Q1 suggest
that selecting grid components based on an identified future grid context is feasible, although not
free from contradictions.
Answers to Q3 show that the result of applying the tool for identifying threats was perceived
well. The result was seen as rather complete (3.83 out of 5, Q3.18) and correct (3.67, Q3.17). The
understandability was rated as 3.28 out of 5 (Easy to understand), as the answer to Q3.16 shows.
Still, the time needed for a formal RA was quite high 3.61 (when 5 is Very long) and a bit diffi-
cult (3.28 out of 5 being Very hard, Q14). Possibly, the participants did not account for re-usability
of the tool. The process was perceived to be useful (3.83), and rather clear (3.5). The workshop
participants might have understood the process and were able to position the tool within it, al-
though they found it a bit difficult to use. Given that the system analysis is a complex topic, we
see the overall results as positive.
From the Q4.21 remarks we can conclude that workshop participants reflected on strong and
weak aspects of the formal modeling using our tool. The reflection (i) indicates the need to clearly
introduce important constructs, (ii) ensures that interactions with the tool are simplified, and (iii)
identifies a way to communicate results with the users in an understandable format. It is worth
noting that while the task can be conducted collaboratively, it might require some effort and time
to resolve possible misinterpretations and contradictory views. We anticipate that further expla-
nation of scenarios and of the underlying aspects might be needed to make the choice of future
scenarios easier.
Finally, we anticipate that the time needed for a formal Risk Assessment was considered in
connection to a complete exercise, which includes the grid evolution, configuring the tool input,
and interpreting the result. The issue of the tool being able to re-run with slight configuration
changes was possibly omitted in the replies.
8.2 Stakeholder Workshop
The stakeholder workshop was organized by the IRENE researchers to assess the use of the IRENE
methods. Three stakeholders participated in the workshop taking over the roles of City Planner,
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Fig. 4. Baseline Scenario for Stakeholder Workshop.
Distributed Network Operator, and Citizen&Business Representative. The stakeholders had ex-
tensive expertise with security, private public relations, and consultancy on relevant topics. Soft-
ware tools were introduced to the stakeholders and it was clarified how modeling tools are in-
tended to improve the resilience of the overall grid. Exercise handouts were given to stakeholders,
who collaboratively decided how to introduce new components or modify existing components to
improve robustness of a baseline grid scenario (see Figure 4). This scenario was built on the idea
of the IEEE 14-nodes grid [45]. The analysis of the three-step evolution of the grid proposed by
stakeholders is expanded in the next section, while additional details on the scenarios used in the
experiments can be found in [44].
8.2.1 Evolutionary Threat Analysis. According to the methodology in Section 5, we first an-
alyzed the baseline scenario in Figure 4. In particular, the baseline scenario represents a basic
setup and, consequently, all the components, i.e., 34 buildings and 33 connections, are considered
as newly added. Our ETA tool identifies 1220 threats from the IRENE threat list that can impact
the grid. 69.9% are structural threats, while the remaining 30.1% emerge due to interconnections
among different components of the grid. Considering the evolution of the “Baseline” suggested by
the stakeholders, our tool pointed out that 54 and 59 structural threats are removed, while 81 and
36 are, respectively, added to that scenario due to the inclusion of the PV and the wind farm in
Node 2, the inclusion of a new battery in Node 1, the removal of one distributed generator each
from Node 1 and Node 2, and the related connections. A similar trend can be observed looking at
the 2nd Scenario, where a battery is removed from Node 3, while a generator is added to the same
node of the grid. Here the total amount of threats decreases, despite the number of components
being exactly the same. This means that the novel component (generator) is affected by a smaller
amount of threats with respect to the removed one (battery). Overall, in its last evolution stage,
the grid can be targeted by 1210 threats. Compared to the overall number of baseline threats, we
can assert that these evolutions lowered the total number of threats that affect our grid scenario.
A detailed report of such analysis is available in [44].
8.2.2 Stakeholders’ Answers and Feedbacks. Among all the feedback received by stakeholders,
we next summarize the ones that are closely related to our methodology and the associated tool
for evolutionary threat analysis.
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• How would you rate the level of easiness in using the tool?
a. (From 1 – Very Low to 7 – Very High) Answers: {4, 5, 6}
• How strongly do you agree the tool is fast in providing simulation results for urban elec-
tricity networks?
b. (From 1 – Completely Disagree to 7 – Completely Agree) Answers: {5, 6, 6}
• How strongly do you agree that the tool is suitable for urban electricity networks?
c. (From 1 – Completely Disagree to 7 – Completely Agree) Answers: {4, 5, 6}
• (Open Question) Applicability and practicability of the tool
d. Stakeholder#1: I felt the tool was almost immediately applicable, but I do think there
needs to be recognition that cross connections will also exist in addition to the vertical
hierarchy shown in the scenario. As a tool that may allow to explore islanding, it will
need to additionally consider the transition from grid to microgrid and back again.
e. Stakeholder#2: Based on my understanding I see opportunity in the ongoing develop-
ment of the tool. From my perspective the ability of the tool to assist with network
congestion– and related security aspects–is a very important aspect and should be of
value to utility companies. I understand there is an aspiration for the tool to be of value
to city planning departments. I think this is possible.
• (Open Question) Efficiency of the tool
f. Stakeholder#1: I feel the tool has a lot to offer but needs further development, essential
will be the facility to save configured networks so they can be reloaded and returned to
at a later date. Usability also needs to be improved, it was apparent at the workshop that
considerable familiarity with the tool was needed to use it in its current form, it will be
important that a user with domain knowledge but little else be able to use the tool.
• (Open Question) Market opportunity for the tool
g. Stakeholder#1: I think there is a commercial use for the tool, but only once it has been
enhanced after further testing. This was supported by Stakeholder #2 (who can be con-
sidered independent). The tool could be marketed as a basic system arrangement cap-
ture and documentation tool, the later may be of particular interest to city planners
and DNO/DSO seniors that may not understand the detailed technical information on
existing diagrams (where they exist).
h. Stakeholder #2: I see an immediate benefit if the tool were to be road tested with some
utility companies so that the concept can be proved and validated. Thiswould help define
the next steps of activity and help make the product adaptable to a range of potential
market sectors.
8.2.3 Summary of Results and Discussions. The stakeholders made remarks on usability and the
targeted use of the tool. In connection to “Efficiency of the tool”, Stakeholder#1 highlighted that
the tool in its current stage needs a more intuitive interface to improve usability. This also impacts
the “Market opportunity for the tool” answers. Stakeholders highlighted that the tool is based on a
methodology with a potential. They also pointed out its applicability as enterprise software, but it
would require further validation and verification with utility companies according to their specific
interests.
Before the end of the workshop, stakeholders suggested several ideas in improving the tool,
where the tool should integrate flexibility to allow for city configurations, a better user-friendly
interface that is simpler to operate, and also a saved output parameters for comparisons based on
different component alterations. Moreover, one of the stakeholders (Citizen&Business representa-
tive) argued that specialized industry knowledge is required in order to fully determine the inputs
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of the tool, highlighting the need for a domain expert for several input parameters, e.g., identifying
the threat list.
Taking into account all opportunities for improvement, the stakeholders found the tool usable
for urban electricity networkmodeling, fast in providing results, and relatively easy to use, if initial
data are entered and relevant knowledge is available.
9 CONCLUSION
This article presented an emergence-oriented approach to threat analysis for evolving cyber-
physical SoSs. The methodology is supported by a tool, which allows us to (i) identify threats and
propose suitable mitigation strategies for evolving SoSs and (ii) reduce the cognitive load required
to ease the understanding of an SoS by capturing the possibly dangerous CSs interactions. The
tool provided means to automatically identify emerging threats related to interacting CSs by trac-
ing their corresponding evolutions. Moreover, with the support of current practice technologies,
the tool supported the analysis of threats’ distribution among time by automatically identifying
mitigation strategies to be implemented, ultimately achieving a safe and secure SoS evolution. The
presented methodology and the supporting tool have been applied to a Smart Grid SoS scenario
based on which results of an evolutionary threat analysis have been reported.
Finally, both the methodology and the supporting tool have been empirically validated on a
Smart Grid case study based on the power grid underlying the campus of an area of University
of Twente. The validation process was based on questionnaires submitted to students in order to
test–among others–how the tool allowed non-expert people to reduce the cognitive load required
for identifying threats in evolving scenarios with respect to a manual identification. Moreover, an-
other workshop session with stakeholders (City Planner, Distributed Network Operator, and Citi-
zen&Business Representative) gave us interesting feedback from a business-oriented point of view.
Overall, both students and stakeholders agreed that the tool helps in reducing the cognitive
load required to capture interactions among grid components in complex systems. We are aware
that the strategy is not mature enough to have concrete market opportunities, but most of the
workshop attendees confirmed that our methodology and the associated tool clearly supported
the threat identification process.
As futurework, we plan to (i) extend themethodologywithmeans to rank identified threats with
respect to their correspondingmitigation costs also considering the specificity of the evaluated SoS
and (ii) improve the usability of the associated tool. Ultimately, this will allow the user of the tool
to plan the evolution of an SoS by also considering the cost related to secure it.
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